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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NILENE AFTON ESKELSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.
13604

vs.
ALLEN C. ESKELSON,
Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal from an order made six months
after the trial of the divorce of the parties in Third District Court. The Order dated January 18, 1974, was made
after a hearing on an Order to Show Cause at which the
Court was requested by the Appellant, among other things,
to reduce alleged arrearages of temporary alimony and
support, which supposedly pre-dated the Decree, to judgment.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judge James E. Sawaya found that the Orders upon
which the contentions of the Appellant were based were
previously "set aside" and that the issues raised by such
contentions were "merged in the final decree". The Court
1
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further expressly found, as a factual matter, that during
the period of time when the arrearages allegedly accumulated "the defendant was disabled and unable to financially meet this obligation." (R. 200)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent seeks the affirmance of the Memorandum Decision of the Trial Court dated January 18, 1974,
(R. 199) and of the subsequent Order dated January 28,
1974, (R. 202) which was based on Judge Sawaya's Findings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 1, 1972, the Plaintiff (Appellant) filed a
Complaint in divorce against the Defendant (Respondent).
The Complaint, which alleged that the Defendant was
"able bodied", "presently employed" and earning approximately "$14,000.00 a year," was served on the Defendant
at Lemmon Valley, Nevada on May 22, 1972. When
served, the Defendant, who had been seriously injured
in an automobile accident on April 15, 1972, was, in fact,
both disabled and unemployed.
On July 19, 1972, pursuant to a hearing on an Order
to Show Cause, Judge Merrill C. Faux awarded custody of
the minor child of the parties, $75.00 per month as temporary child support, $500.00 per month as temporary
alimony, $100.00 attorney fees and some shares in the
Interstate Motor Lines Credit Union to the Plaintiff. The
Defendant was neither present at the hearing nor represented by counsel and was a resident of the State of
Nevada. At the time of the award, the Defendant's total
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monthly income from all sources was less than $575.00.
The award was erroneously founded on the assumption
that the Defendant had income equivalent to that earned
in 1971, prior to his disability.
On August 9, 1972, the District Court, Emmett L.
Brown presiding, granted a Decree of Divorce and made
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which were, by
the terms of the documents, to become final three months
after entry. (R. 44) The divorce was granted after the
entry of the Defendant's default.
On November 9, 1972, the Court, through Merrill
C. Faux, the same judge who presided over the Hearing
on the Order to Show Cause, deferred the "effective date"
of the Decree pending "further order" of the Court. (R.
50) On the same day, the Defendant, through his counsel,
moved to set aside the Default Judgment under the provisions of Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(R. 55) Counsel for the parties thereupon stipulated to
the dissolution of the marriage as provided in the Decree,
the effective date of which was deferred, and agreed that
all other matters raised by the Motion to Set Aside the
Default Judgment "may be held in abeyance to be disposed of at the time Defendant's Motion is heard." The
Stipulation was drafted by Plaintiff's original Counsel,
D. Gary Christian. (R. 58) In his Order Terminating
Marriage Relationship of Parties, which was signed by
Judge Snow, Mr. Christian specified that "Those matters
raised by Defendant in his Motion dated November 9,
1972, relating to alimony, child support and other matters
are held in abeyance and are not final until the time of
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the hearing of Defendant's Motion and an Order made in
relation thereto." (R. 60, emphasis supplied).
On March 26, 1973, the Defendant's Motion to Set
Aside the Default Judgment was heard before Marcellus
K. Snow. The Affidavit of the Defendant in support of
the Motion (R. 61), which was, as far as these matters are
concerned, uncontroverted, asserted that the Defendant
was injured on April 15, 1972; that he required surgery
on June 4, 1972, twelve days after the Complaint was
filed; that, on the day the Decree was entered, the Defendant was, on orders of his physician, "unable to drive
and, basically, advised against travel of every kind." (R.
63) It was further alleged that the Defendant had, with
reasonable diligence, secured the services of Nevada
counsel, whose performance he had sought to monitor, and
that the inexcusably dilatory performance of his counsel,
through no fault of the Defendant, had resulted in the
taking of the default. (R. 62)
On April 20, 1973, after Notice (R. 55, 65) and a
hearing attended by counsel for both parties, the Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment was
granted (R. 74) and the Defendant was permitted, by
order of the Court, to answer each of the allegations of
the original Complaint with the exception of those pertaining to the dissolution of the marriage. (R. 74) Defendant filed an Answer and Counterclaim. (R. 76) The
Plaintiff filed a Reply to Defendant's Counterclaim (R.
81), proceeded to make discovery (R. 84) and stipulated
to the Defendant's Motion for Early Trial. (R. 88)
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The case was tried over a period of several days before the Honorable James E. Sawaya. Upon the full hearing of all pertinent facts, the Court drafted the Memorandum Decision (R. 132) upon which the Decree was based.
At the time of trial, the Defendant was receiving, as his
sole source of income, Social Security Disability. (R. 132)
The Decree granted "nominal" alimony of $1.00 per year,
and awarded the home of the parties to the Plaintiff subject to the requirement that she pay the Defendant
$4,000.00 upon remarriage, when the minor child achieved his majority or when the home was sold. (R. 133) The
Memorandum Decision provided for attorney's fees in the
sum of $500.00. (R. 133) The Decree, drafted by Plaintiff's counsel, made reference to the $500.00 figure for
attorney's fees and indicated that the $500.00 amount was
"in addition to any amount awarded by the Court to
Plaintiff for the use and benefit of her attorney on any
previous Order to Show Causes". (R. 140) Plaintiff's
trial counsel then withdrew from the case. (R. 141) On
September 17, 1973, Defendant's Counsel moved to amend
the Decree of Divorce so that the provision for attorney
fees might more nearly conform to the Memorandum Decision of Judge Sawaya. Notice of the hearing was given
directly to the Plaintiff. (R. 144)
Subsequent to the trial, and after the amendment of
the Decree, Defendant alleged by means of an Order to
Show Cause, that the Plaintiff had remarried and was
living in Lindon, Utah, as Mrs. Milton Lyman. (R. 143)
The Defendant alleged, by virtue of the Plaintiffs remarriage, that he was entitled to the $4,000.00 for his
interest in the home of the parties as provided by the
5
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Memorandum Decision. The Defendant's Order to Show
Cause was heard on December 7, 1973. 1 In response to
this Order to Show Cause, first a Counter-Affidavit (R.
150), and then, later, an Affadivit in Support of an Order
to Show Cause (R. 176) for the Plaintiff, was filed with
the Court. In these documents, the issues raised at the
Hearing on the Second Order to Show Cause, brought by
the Plaintiff on January 17, 1974, which gave rise to this
appeal, were first raised.

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE ISSUES RAISED ON THIS APPEAL
UNTIMELY.

ARE

The Plaintiff claims on appeal, for the first time ever,
that the Order of the Court (R. 50) which stayed the effective date of the Decree until a hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment could be
heard, was null and void. (Apps. Brief, p. 22) It is
also now alleged that the Decree was final on November
9, 1972, when the Court was petitioned by the Defendant
to set aside its earlier default judgment.
iThe Plaintiff denied that she had in fact remarried. The Court
concurred and denied the Defendant's motion to compel payment of the
$4,000.00 because the prerequisite condition, remarriage, had not occurred.
There was, however, evidence that the Plaintiff had registered at the Utah
Valley Hospital as Nilene Lyman and at the office of her physician; that
she had purchased the Orchid Shop in Lindon, Utah, under the name
Lyman (R. 156); that the phone in her Lindon residence was so listed;
that she had purchased wholesale floral supplies under that name (Exhibits filed December 7, 1973); that she had "represented" that she was
Mrs. Lyman to "people" (R. 157); that Mr. Lyman had lived with her at
her home in Lindon and that they were not discrete. (R. 157)
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Although the issues which gave rise to these contentions of the Plaintiff were raised in their entirety by the
proceedings on November 9, 1972, they were never discovered and considered at any stage of the proceedings
before the trial court. A careful search of the Order to
Show Cause from which this appeal is perfected (R. 187)
and of the Affidavit in Support of the Order to Show
Cause (R. 176) demonstrates conclusively that such items
were not on the agenda for consideration on January 17,
1974. Not until July 1, 1974, twenty months from the
date of the alleged offenses, did the plaintiff raise these
considerations and then, only in the context of this appeal.
The plaintiff did not appeal from the November 9,
1972, Order which stayed the effective date of the Decree,
or from the April 20, 1973, Order which set aside the
default judgment. When the Court considered, at a hearing attended by counsel for the parties, the arguments for
setting aside the default, the plaintiff's trial counsel did
not contend as her appellate counsel now does, that the
Court's earlier Order on November 9 had deprived his
client of due process of law or of material rights. Not at
the trial, at the hearing on the First Order to Show Cause
on December 7, 1973, or at the hearing on the Second
Order to Show Cause dated January 17, 1974, were such
considerations raised, by either Plaintiff's trial or appellate Counsel.
The Plaintiff did not appeal from the Memorandum
Decision of the Court, at the conclusion of the trial (R.
133) which was embodied in the Decree dated August
27, 1973. (R. 140) Only now are the considerations raised
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on this appeal from the decision on the Second Order to
Show Cause which was heard six months after the trial
and roughly five months after the date of the entry of
the Decree. The hearing, from which this appeal is taken,
was held to consider a question of contempt on a custody
question and to consider, six months after the trial, the
reduction of alleged temporary alimony, support and
attorney's fees to judgment. (R. 187)
The Court's Order dated April 20, 1973, setting aside
a Default Judgment against the Defendant like the Order
of November 9, 1972, staying the effective date of the
Decree, was in the nature of an interlocutory order to be
raised on appeal by reference to the provisions of Rule
72 (b). Baer v. Young, 25 U.2d 198, 479 P.2d 351. The
time in which to appeal such determinations had long run
on January 17, 1974, when the second post-trial Order to
Show Cause was heard by Judge Sawaya. Whether appealed as an interlocutory order under Rule 72 (b), or as a
final order under Rule 72 (a), the period for appeal had
expired when, on February 18, 1974, seven months after
the trial, the Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal. (R.
205) The Plaintiff made no effort after the entry of either
of the orders to preserve a right of appeal on the issues
which were decided, pending a final determination of
other claims. No document was filed with the trial court
or served on opposing counsel indicating notice of intent
to appeal. 2
An interlocutory appeal, particularly, is properly
granted if it appears essential to adjudicate threshold
2
The procedure required by Rule 72 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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principles of law or procedure as a foundation upon which
the trial may proceed, or if there is a high likelihood that
the litigation can be finally disposed of on such an appeal.
Manwill v. Oyler, 11 U.2d 433, 361 P.2d 177. That the
Appellant's counsel considered the November 9, 1972,
issue to be one of that character is clearly indicated in his
declaration that "A resolving of this point (i.e. declaring
the order a nullity) leaves all other questions moot."
(App's. Brief, p. 12)
Having taken their chances on the trial of the matter
without preliminary appeal under Rule 72 (b), without
preserving the right to appeal decided issues under Rule
72 (a) and without appealing from the Decree in normal
fashion under the same rule, the questions now raised
are untimely. It would be a serious circumvention of the
appellate procedure if such substantive matters could be
raised six months subsequent to the trial in the context
of an appeal from an order to show cause. Such an
effort is particularly devious when the controverted
issues were, as here, not raised at the time of the hearing
on the Order to Show Cause or in the pleadings which attended it.
Failure to appeal when the Orders were made, or at
the conclusion of the trial, effectively precludes the present assertion of such issues. When an attempted appeal
is untimely, this Court does not acquire jurisdiction to consider the matter. Watson v. Anderson, 29 Ut. 2d 36, 504
P.2d 1003. See also: Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Ut. 2d 277>
282 P.2d 845.

9
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POINT

II

THE DIVORCE WAS NOT FINAL WHEN
THE ORDER STAYING
THE EFFECTIVE
DATE WAS ENTERED.
The Plaintiff argues, on this appeal, that the Decree
was filed on August 9, 1972, and that the Motion to Set
Aside was filed on November 9, 1972, more than three
months after the filing of the Decree. Section 30-3-7
U.C.A. as amended is cited for the proposition that the
Decree, three months having expired, became absolute before the Motion to Set Aside was filed.
The per curiam opinion of this Court in In re Lynch's
Estate, 123 Utah 57, 254 P. 2d 454 is directly in point. In
the Lynch case, the appealable order was entered on November 22, 1952. The Notice of Appeal, although it had
been served on the respondent in a timely fashion, was not
filed with the Court until December 23, 1952. The Respondent, the executrix of the estate, moved to dismiss
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction claiming that the notice
was not filed within one month after the appellant's
motion, the denial of which constituted the appealable
order, was denied. In dismissing the appeal the Court
took the position that "One month is a calendar month."8
This is the position most generally taken by the majority
of our Courts.4 This Court stated, (concerning the "calendar month"),
s

In Re Lynch's Estate, supra at 454.
See: 86 CJ.S. "Time", Section 10, page 837 (Calendar "month"
termed "generally uniform"); 52 Am Jur "Time," Section 11, page 338,
("the term 'month' is now universally computed by the calendar") See
also: citations there furnished.
4
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"Such a month commences at the beginning of
the day of the month on which it starts and ends at
the expiration of the day before the same day of
the next month. Thus a month which starts with
the beginning of the first day of a calendar month
would end at the end of the last day of such month,
and not at the last end of the first day of the next
month. If the month in question commenced on
a day other than the first day of such month, such
as at the beginning of the 23rd day of such month,
it would end at the expiration of the 22nd day of
the next month and not at the expiration of the
23rd day of the next month, which would be the
beginning of another month. In the present case
we exclude from our calculation the day of the act
or event after which the designated period of time
begins to run, which is November 22, 5 the day on
which the motion was overruled, and start counting from the beginning of the 23rd day of that
month; from that time one month would end at
the expiration of the 22nd day of December, or
just before the 23rd commenced, which marked
the beginning of another month. 6
Applying the same principle to the instant case, the
difference being only between one month and three
months, from August 10, 1972, the date of beginning, to
November 9, 1972, is a period of three months.
5
For this exclusion there is statutory authority. Section 68-3-7 U.C.A.,
pertaining to the construction of statutes, reads as follows:
"Time, how computed. — The time in which any act provided by
law is to be done is computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last is a holiday, and then it is also excluded/'
(Emphasis supplied)
Rule 6 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure likewise provides that,
"In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these
rules, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the
act, event or default after which the designated period of time begins
to run is not to be included. . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
6
See also: Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 P. 2d 845, which
quotes liberally from the Lynch case and applies its underlying principles.
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POINT

III

THE ORDER OF APRIL 20, 1973, NOT THE
ORDER OF NOVEMBER 9, 1973, OPERATED
TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT
PROVISIONS.
THE PLAINTIFF WAS REPRESENTED
AT
THE APRIL 20 HEARING
BY HER TRIAL
COUNSEL WHO APPEARED PURSUANT TO
NOTICE.
The central thrust of the Plaintiff's argument, Point
1, is that the interlocutory decree was set aside without
notice or hearing. The authorities cited in the Brief stand
for this proposition. Such was not the case. Plaintiff confuses the distinction between deferring the effective date
of the Decree, withholding its finality, and the abrogation of its terms and provisions. The Affidavit of Defendant's counsel asked that the Court "stay the effective
date" of the Decree so that it should not become "binding
and final" before the Defendant's Motion for relief from
its terms could be heard. (R. 48, 49) The Court, "upon
application or on its own motion for good cause shown"
had the authority "to waive, alter or extend" the period
of time before the Decree should become absolute for not
to exceed six months. 7 In addition to the Affidavit of
Defendant's counsel, which alleged that the Defendant
was neither present in person nor represented by counsel
at the time of the hearing and the entry of the Default,
the Court had before it when it entered its November 9
Order the record which showed that the Defendant was a
resident of Nevada served by means of the Long Arm
Statute in that jurisdiction (R. 44), Findings of Fact which

7

Section 30-3-7 U.C.A. as amended.
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indicated that he was off work by reason of injury at the
time the Decree was entered (R. 39) and a dollar award
of $575.00 per month at a time when the Findings indicated the Defendant had, as temporary income, relief
funds of $125.00 per week. (R. 39)
The Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was filed
on the same day that the Order of Judge Faux was entered.
It was never intended that the Order of November 9
should deprive the plaintiff of material rights without due
process of law, or eliminate of itself, any right acquired
by virtue of the Default Decree. The November 9 Order
merely deferred the effective date of the Decree pending
further order of the Court.
On April 20, 1973, after a Stipulation of Counsel (R.
58), after an exchange of Affidavits (R. 61, 52), after a
continuance agreed upon by counsel (R. 57), and after one
projected hearing at which Plaintiff's counsel failed to
appear (R. 66), Plaintiff's trial counsel and Defendant's
counsel appeared before the Court pursuant to Notice
(R. 55, 65) and argued the merits of the Motion to Set
Aside. The Court then explicitly said, after Notice, Affidavits, Argument and a Hearing that,
". . . the Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default
Judgment is granted and . . . Defendant shall be
entitled to answer each of the allegations of the
original Complaint with the exception of those
provisions pertaining to the dissolution of the
marriage of the parties, which dissolution was
ordered by the Court on the 16th day of January,
1973, pursuant to a Stipulation on file herein."

13
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Not until the entry of this Order, was the Plaintiff deprived of any substantive right which she claimed to have
derived from the earlier hearing at which the Defendant,
against whom such rights were asserted, was neither present nor represented by counsel.
In substance and effect, Plaintiff's counsel ratified
the November 9 Order in the Stipulation dated January
11, 1973, when he agreed that all matters brought up in
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment
other than the termination of the marital status "may be
held in abeyance to be disposed of at the time Defendant's
Motion is heard." (R. 58, emphasis supplied)

POINT

IV

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN
SETTING
ASIDE ITS EARLIER ORDERS RELATING TO
ALIMONY AND CHILD
SUPPORT.
The original Order for temporary alimony and support money, like the original Decree, was predicated upon
the erroneous assumption that the Defendant's income in
1972 was comparable to his income in 1971, which had
been $16,576.00. (R. 39) It was claimed, again in error,
that the respondent earned, for the first six months of
1972, in excess of $1,100.00 per month. (R. 39) These
facts were perpetuated in the Appellant's Brief. (Brief,
p. 15)
The Defendant's 1972 tax return, which was utilized
at the January 17, 1974 hearing and which is a matter of
record (R. 96), disclosed that the Defendant in fact earned
14
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in 1972 a total of $5,254.00, when adjusted $4,733.00,
which was received, almost in its entirety, before the disabling injury of April 15, 1972. From April 15, 1972,
through the trial of the matter on July 11, 1973, a period
of in excess of one year, the Defendant had no earnings.
For that period he was entitled to or received $50.00 per
week for 26 weeks from the Teamsters Union; $75.00 per
week for 52 weeks under the Drivers Benefit plan provided by Interstate Motor Lines;8 $1,000.00 as a result of
his automobile injury and Social Security Disability.
Although the Defendant was disabled when the original Order was entered on July 20, 1972, a fact clearly
known to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff proceeded to obtain,
based on the uncontested factual findings related to the
Defendant's income prior to his disability, an Order directing the disabled and absent Defendant to pay, among
other things, the $575.00 per month. This amounted,
without consideration of peripheral items, such as the indebtedness of the parties, to an annual dollar award
against the unemployed Defendant of $6,900.00. In addition, Plaintiff's appellate counsel has asserted that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees in connection with a series
of orders over an approximate 14 month period of
$1,475.00. The total of the claimed support, alimony and
attorney's fees, approximated, for the first year, $8,375.00,
or nearly $700.00 per month.
A series of judges, beginning with Judge Faux, who
had entered the original Order (R. 34), Judge Snow who
8
On July 25, 1972, Plaintiff obtained a Writ of Garnishment (R.
25) against IML Freight Lines. She then proceeded to collect 48 of the
52 $75.00 weekly payments from IML.
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set aside the Court's earlier orders and Judge Sawaya, the
trial judge, 0 considering the impossibility of the performance of such orders, the jurisdictional problems concerning their entry, and the faulty factual basis which supported them, all after careful and detailed consideration,
made subsequent orders intended to alleviate the problem
and provide the harried Defendant with some relief.
Such orders did not unfairly discriminate against the
Plaintiff. From April 1972, the date of his disability, to
August of 1973, when the trial was completed, the Defendant received or otherwise had from all sources, the
sum of $5,908.00.10
During this same period of time, the Plaintiff received funds from or on behalf of the Defendant in the
approximate amount of $7,047.00. 11
9
W h o also heard two lengthy Orders to Show Cause subsequent to
the trial, one of which, that of January 17, 1974, gave rise to this appeal.
10

Broken down, Defendant received:
$1,300.00 Teamsters Health and Welfare
670.00 Accrued payroll, IML
322.00 Balance in bank at separation from Plaintiff
1,000.00 Casualty Insurance payment, accident April 15, 1972
2,316.00 Social Security Disability, November, 1972 through
August of 1973 ($257.40 per month)
300.00 IML Drivers Benefit Plan (4 weeks)
$5,908.00
11
Broken down, Plaintiff received:
$3,600.00 IML Drivers Benefit Plan (48 weeks)
(figure approximate, some minor deductions)
1,544.00 Social Security
1,352.00 Second mortgage payments at Murray First Thrift
and Loan Company (nine payments $900.00 made
by disability insurance, four payments $452.00
made by Defendant)
484.00 1971 Tax refund. Defendant's name signed by Plaintiff
67.20 Refund of casualty insurance. Defendant's name
___
signed by Plaintiff.
$7,047.60
In addition to the aforegoing, Plaintiff had other income of at least
$160.00 per month, net (R. 15). During the year 1972, Defendant made
payments on other indebtedness of the parties in the amount of $650.81.
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The Court, in its Memorandum Decision upon which the
Decree was based, awarded the plaintiff the home of the
parties, the equity in which was estimated at trial to have
a value of $17,000.00. The Court did order that the
Plaintiff pay the Defendant $4,000.00 for his interest in
the home, as earlier mentioned, upon the happening of
certain specified contingencies.
The Plaintiff received through August of 1973, more
than $1,000.00 more than the Defendant; together with
the award of $13,000.00 of the approximate $17,000.00
equity interest of the parties in their Salt Lake City home
and the use, for a virtually indeterminate period, of the
Defendant's share of such equity.
That the amount now sought for retroactive payments
was clearly understood to have been set aside was made
clear by the simple fact that the question of an arrearage,
such as that now urged in this appeal, was never raised at
the time of trial. From April 20, 1973, to December 6,
1973, when the Plaintiff's new counsel first raised the
issue by affidavit (R. 150), there was no effort to claim
the * "affidavit" retroactive payments despite the fact that
all economic facets of the case were meticulously considered at the trial which concluded on July 11, 1973.
The Openshaw case,12 which is cited for the central
proposition of the Plaintiff's brief that the Court cannot
retroactively modify alimony or child support install-

12

105 Ut. 574, 144 P.2d 528
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ments accrued and past due, is not applicable to the circumstances here. That case refers specifically to the modification of an existing and valid decree13 and does not
govern a situation where a decree is set aside. If such
were not the case, the Court would not have the power to
set aside such installments, however abusive, in the face
of any order, however invalid. In this case, reduced to its
sum and substance, the Plaintiff concludes that the disabled Defendant was obligated for the sum of $575.00 a
month, plus attorney's fees, and that the Court was powerless to afford relief. In effect, the Openshaw decision referred to cases involving the modification not the invalidation of the original decree. In the former case, it is presumed that the facts, until they were so changed and
altered as to permit the modification, supported the underlying order upon which the installments were based. In
the latter instance it is presumed, as is in fact the case here,
that for reasons which became later apparent, the underlying order was itself infirm and needed to be set aside
rather than modified.
The order giving rise to the claimed accrued installments was based on incorrect facts and was impossible of
performance. It was entered in the face of jurisdictional
problems and complicated, through no fault of the Defendant, by the absence at the time of the Defendant or
his counsel. Judge Sawaya expressly found that the earlier

13
In fact, the Decree in the Openshaw case which was decided on
December 30, 1943, was originally entered on August 22, 1932. The final
judgment was, then, at the time it was considered by this Court, over 11
years old and the claimed installments were for a period of eight years.
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orders of the Court "were set aside and that the issues considered and raised in such Orders were subsequently considered and merged into the final Decree." (R. 199) Plaintiff's trial counsel did not request that the alleged accrued
installments be reduced to judgment at the time of trial or
that they be included as additional items in the Decree
which he in fact drafted. Plaintiffs counsel made no mention of or claim for such items although, had he deemed
them legitimate, their consideration could not have been
other than a matter of first concern.

Where an Order, or, as here, the Order and the Decree, is set aside; where the underlying order is invalid and
not merely modified by reason of a later change in circumstance, then the payments which it requires should
likewise be susceptible to retroactive modification or,
more probably, cancellation, in the sound discretion of
the trial Court.

In Edwards v. Edwards (Kansas), 324 P2d 150 (1958)
the Kansas Supreme Court, which applied the Openshaw
principle to installments of permanent alimony and support, took the position that the rule that past due installments for child support ordered paid by the final decree
become final judgments as of the dates due and that
they may be collected in the same manner as other
judgments is inapplicable to past due installments of support allowed pendente lite divorce action. The Court
reasoned that an Order for temporary support pendente
lite was a temporary or ad interim provision not in the
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nature of a final judgment on which execution can issue.14
It concluded that "no vested rights" are acquired in the
amount allowed the wife and children pending the divorce
action. Quoting Corpus Juris Secundum, the Court said,
"Like other interlocutory orders, an order for support money pendente lite entered pursuant to G.S.
1949, 60-1507, remains solely in the sound discretion of court which made it, (citations omitted) and
may be modified as varying circumstances justify
during the time the action is pending in any form
in the district court, even to the extent of discharging accrued and unpaid installments." (citations
omitted)
Many Courts have departed from the restrictions
placed upon the retroactive modification of installments
of permanent alimony which have accrued, the proposition
for which the Opens haw case, now over 30 years old
stands.
In 6 ALR 2d, it is stated that,
14
The Kansas Supreme Court reasoned that, unlike an order for
permanent alimony or support which represents a final determination of
the rights of the parties, an application for a temporary order does not
concern the merits of the action. In temporary proceedings the Court is
concerned that the complaint states a cause of action, that the plaintiff
is prosecuting the cause in good faith, that the parties are married and that
the wife and children are in need of support during the pendency of proceedings.
The Kansas Supreme Court, concluding that its decision was supported
by the preponderant weight of authority, took the position that the
District Court had full control of the interim procedure, including the
power to review, modify, revoke or reinstate its temporary order at any
time. Since, the Court said, the temporary order did not touch upon the
merits of the action, it did not qualify as a final order (i.e. by Kansas
statute, an order affeaing a substantial right in an action) and hence
an order amending, modifying or revoking the ad interim provision was
not itself appealable.

20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"However, if there is any point to be gained
in characterizing a view as majority or minority, it
is submitted that the courts in the majority of the
states have the power to grant the husband relief,
either directly by cancelling arrears or indirectly
by refusing to enforce payment or by restraining
the wife from collecting arrears."
The power to modify an order for alimony pendente
lite includes the power to cancel accrued and unpaid installments. 24 Am Jur 2, "Divorce and Separation", Section 557, p. 682. Had the Order for the payment of the
claimed alimony not been set aside, as it in fact was, the
Court had the power to cancel the arrearage. Such a cancellation proved unnecessary, however, since the underlying order and the Decree upon which the installments
Were predicated, was repudiated and void ab initio. The
Court concluded that the original decree of August 9,
1972, was set aside and was "of no force and effect". Judge
Sawaya also determined that the orders upon which the
plaintiff's claim for alimony and support allegedly in
arrears were predicated "were set aside and the issues merged in the final decree". (Memorandum Decision, James S.
Sawaya, R. 200) Had the Court not so found, it could have,
under prevailing authorities, even in the face of valid and
subsisting orders, have cancelled the arrears.
The Court expressly found as a factual matter, that
during the time when the alleged arrearages were accumulating "the defendant was disabled and unable to financially meet this obligation . . ." (R. 200) Where the Court
has the power to cancel arrears of alimony, the fact that
the husband's ability to pay alimony or support has be21
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come impaired after the entry of the original decree is a
ground for cancelling all or part of the arrears which
accrued because of such inability to pay. Kumlin v. Kumlin, 200 Minn. 26, 273 N . W . 253, See also: 6 ALR 2d 1294
section 10. In this case, the Defendant's disability was, to
make matters worse, an accomplished fact prior to the
entry of the offending orders. The recitals concerning Mr.
Eskelson's 1971 and 1972 income, while not totally inaccurate, were misleading when applied to his circumstances at the time of the entry of the default judgments.
A number of cases have taken the position that where
temporary alimony has been awarded during the pendency
of an action for divorce, and thereafter, a final judgment
or decree is entered awarding a divorce, the wife may not
thereafter enforce the order for temporary alimony for the
amount due at the time of the dismissal or final decree,
unless the right to such installments is saved by the final
decree. Richardson v. Richardson, 218 Minn. 42, 15 N . W .
2d 127; Maddox v. Maddox, 276 Ala. 197, 160 So. 2d
481. In New York all proceedings to enforce the payment
of temporary alimony must be taken during the pendency
of the action. Mittman v. Mittman, 263 App. Div. 384,
33 NYS 2d 211. Such a position does not necessitate the
forfeiture by the wife of all rights to enforce the payment of arrearages. It does preserve such rights, when
proper, by appropriate provision in the final decree.
Surely, the consideration of such items is essential to proper consideration of the allocation of assets. It is unlikely,
had plaintiff and her counsel not stood mute at trial with
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respect to the question of the only recently asserted arrearages, that the Court would have awarded the plaintiff
virtually the entire equity in the home of the parties, the
primary asset of their over 20 year marriage.
A finding by this Court that the trial Court's decision
was supported by the evidence and within the Court's
power, should also govern those questions raised in the
appellant's brief concerning attorney's fees.15 The rules
which govern the allowance of suit money, including
attorney's fees, are ordinarily the same as those which
govern the allowance of temporary alimony. Tolls v.
Tolls, 160 Ar. 317, 85 P2d 366, 119 ALR 1370. Judge
Sawaya expressly found, from a profusion of different
orders, that the total of the attorney's fees as merged in
the Decree was $500.00. To this he added additional expenses for two separate hearings. (R. 200) One was the
hearing setting aside the Decree. By this expedient, the
Judge again affirmed his belief that the original orders,
in which the numerous claimed awards for attorney's fees
were found, had been set aside and were of no force and
effect.

15
And also the IML stock, which is not stock in the Company but
shares in the Credit Union, pledged on the parties' obligation. The provision for the allocation of the stock was contained in the original Decree,
August 9, 1972, which was set aside. (R. 203)
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CONCLUSION
The trial Court acted within its powers after detailed
consideration of the facts. A careful reading of the record
dispels the notion that any error was committed which
would justify the reversal of the Court's Memorandum
Decision. The appeal is, as to all matters, untimely. The
Order made on January 28, 1974, should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JOEL M. ALLRED
345 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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